March 18, 2004
Fallout of the Spanish Bombings
I know I have yet to say anything about the train bombings in Spain and the resulting upset win in the elections by the Socialists. This is mostly because there’s a lot of good insights out there to be absorbed. I have to admit that foreign affairs and history are not really my strong suit, but I’m a quick study, so here’s what I have to offer. As always, I’m perfectly willing to be corrected.
Ignore the Spin
Both the conservatives and liberals knew how to spin this long before it happened. If there were no more terrorist attacks, liberals knew they’d say conservatives were overreacting, but if there was an attack, they’d just say the conservatives’ strategy wasn’t working. Conversely, the conservatives’ argument if there were no more terrorist attacks would simply be that it was because the strategy was working, but if there was an attack, it meant we needed to react even more forcefully.
So I advise completely ignoring any such simplistic arguments as partisan politics as usual. There’s more to analyze here. First, there was the whole question of whether the Spanish election results were what al-Qaeda intended. I personally don’t see much doubt anymore that it was, especially in light of the recent evidence. And yes, I also think Spain’s pulling out its troops from Iraq was important, although perhaps not in the obvious way.
Appeasement and Godwin’s Law
Also be wary of those who throw around the word “appeasement,” like Friedman and Brooks. Users of this word are clearly attempting to capitalize on the fact that most people equate appeasement with Chamberlain giving Hitler what he wanted, thus bringing up Hitler while trying to skirt around Godwin’s Law. They’re also counting on most people’s limited understanding of the myriad reasons behind Chamberlain’s decision (including the rather important fact that Britain was no military match for Germany at the time). And just as with Iraq, it’s a very poor parallel. Our side is now the one with the superior military capability.
I think Steven Den Beste’s hammering of the Spanish and French is an example of why it’s such a poor parallel:
Nations which are weak or craven increase their chances of being targeted when they appease the Islamists. The Islamists don’t seem to be seriously targeting the US any longer because they know that we’ll fight back…They’d rather target nations they think will surrender and beg for mercy. It’s far more cost effective. Nations who demonstrate that they do not have the resolve to fight are more inviting targets. (And after the events of the last 30 months, the Islamists are badly in need of some victories, to maintain the flow of recruits and money.)
…France’s opposition to the invasion of Iraq and its steadfast support for the Palestinians don’t seem to have given it any immunity. On the contrary, if this is represents more than just an empty threat, it will turn out that France is being targeted because its leaders showed that they were willing to do whatever it took to appease the Islamists.
It’s true that France does not have any immunity, but it’s doubtful that immunity was its goal in the first place anyway, or else it wouldn’t have banned Muslim scarves and wouldn’t be combating Islamists within its borders and in Africa. And of course, the real question isn’t whether France is immune, but Spain. Realistically, Spain doesn’t really need to worry too much because now it’s pretty far down al-Qaeda’s priority list, and al-Qaeda is hardly likely to have much success turning around all of the countries ahead of it. It may seem a daunting task for us to stamp out terrorism, but the task that the terrorists face is ridiculously impossible — al-Qaeda really is less likely to defeat the West than the Palestinians are likely to destroy Israel. Realistically, both can perhaps score enough civilian casualties to eventually extract some political concessions, and their absolute best-case scenario is to provoke an overreaction that escalates and widens the conflict. Either way, this threat is still in stark contrast with Nazi Germany, which posed a direct and immediate threat towards conquering the whole world.
And al-Qaeda doesn’t seem to be in such need of victories because they just got one. And in my opinion, the Spanish bombing didn’t strike me so much as a move of desperation as one of calculation — one that appears to have paid off. It’s rather striking that Den Beste can seem so pessimistic about both sides in the same post.
Was It Even Appeasement?
For that matter, whether Spain’s move really amounts to appeasement has yet to be seen, as they can still fight terrorism effectively without helping the occupation of Iraq. At Reason, Julian Sanchez has an excellent political analysis of the complex forces at work in the Spanish election (the whole piece is well worth reading), and concludes with:
The electoral motives that led to this result are ambiguous and complex. So why have so many been quick to cry “appeasement”? Appeasement, after all, is largely a matter of perception: What really matters, in terms of encouraging or discouraging future attacks, is not so much whether Spanish voters were trying to appease terrorists, but whether the terrorists themselves perceive the result that way. By insisting that the election results constituted capitulation to terror, the hand-wringers are perversely, irresponsibly bringing about the very result they pretend to decry. Why?…David Frum tips his hand when he writes that “the voters of Spain have indelibly associated the anti-Iraq position with one motive above all: fear,” and goes on to suggest—one might say _hope_—that a vote for John Kerry will also come to be seen as cowardly capitulation to terror, as appeasing Al Qaeda. It is hard to suppress the suspicion that much of the criticism of Spaniards we’re now seeing is ultimately, if indirectly, about the U.S. election. Fail to support Bush, whispers the subtext of these critiques, and you might as well be some sort of Spaniard.
I’ll take that as a compliment.
For reference, here’s the Frum piece he refers to.
A Victory for al-Qaeda?
At the same time, many on both sides seem to be trying to downplay the Spanish election results, not really recognizing it as a victory for al-Qaeda’s, like Matthew Yglesias
So I wouldn’t worry too much about appeasement in the global sense — on the contrary, bringing to power a government that will focus on al-Qaeda rather than Iraq should be good for the war on terror
I know liberals like to keep hammering that there was no connection between Iraq and al-Qaeda, but it’s a bit of a stretch to imagine that Spain’s pulling its troops out of Iraq has any bearing at all on its ability to fight the war on terror. Spain is in no position to use their military to aid in the war on terror, unlike the U.S., which, if it hadn’t gotten bogged down in Iraq, could presumably have used its military — at least as leverage — on states like Iran. Besides, liberals are always pointing out that the War on Terror should be fought primarily with police actions and intelligence.
So at best, Spain’s withdrawal of its troops from Iraq is neutral, and not a positive. However, there are more ramifications of the election results than just that. As Julian Sanchez pointed out, appeasement is all about perception. Sebastian Holsclaw echoes this
Even if the Spanish people intended to punish the old government for jumping to conclusions about the ETA being responsible … , this will still be seen by Al-Qaeda as an effective show of force because they caused a change which seemingly would not have happened without their slaughter of more than 200 people.If it is true that the War on Terrorism is about a battle for the hearts and minds of the people in the Middle East, Al-Qaeda just won a huge battle because they are now able to suggest to their own people that they have the power to topple large western governments.
Emphasis mine. This perception is actually quite important. Even if you believe that Iraq is irrelevant to the War on Terrorism (a topic which I’ll have to put off for another post), the important change is that the prestige of al-Qaeda is greatly enhanced in the eyes of those who already oppose the U.S. but were undecided in whether to support or join al-Qaeda. The results help cement al-Qaeda’s reputation (deserved or not) of being able to achieve concrete results.
Who Might Be Next?
Den Beste’s dire warnings to France really aren’t that meaningful, since, as I mentioned before, I highly doubt France is very high on their list of priorities. France already opposes U.S. foreign policy, and it seems to me that the attack on Spain indicates that al-Qaeda places a high political priority on turning nations against the U.S.
Indeed, they have almost as little to gain from attacking France as, say, attacking Spain again. To be an effective bully, you need to bully those you want to fall in line. To maximize the effect, it certainly helps to make a very visible example of your target, which they did. But to bully someone who is perceived to be already complying is counterproductive in that it strengthens the resolve of others who may realize they have little to gain by cooperating and are damned either way.
This is why I don’t think France is a likely target anytime soon. Spain was a prime target because they were an example of a country whose government supported the U.S. invasion of Iraq but whose people overwhelmingly opposed it. This could be a key clue to al-Qaeda’s next priorities. As Dan Darling’s excellent analysis concludes (and yes, the whole thing is definitely worth reading):
The more immediate danger, rather, lies in various European nations where a sizeable percentage of the population opposes the war in Iraq. Britain is probably safe for the time being - the opposition Tories are certainly just as if not more supportive of the war in Iraq as Blair’s own Labour party, but this is not the case in countries like Denmark, the Netherlands, Italy, ect. The same is also true of Eastern Europe, where opposition to the war in Iraq, though not nearly as massive as their western counterparts, could easily provoke as parliamentary crisis in the event of a major al-Qaeda attack. More to the point, as a result of the election results in Spain, al-Qaeda has sent a clear message: those European leaders who support America do so at their own national and political peril.
Emphasis mine. And while I’m no expert on British politics, it would seem to me that it would behoove the Tories to take political advantage of the British people’s widespread opposition to the Iraq invasion. Such a political vacuum would never last for long over here.
I think the real lesson to learn is that obtaining the support of just a country’s government is far from enough. Without the support of that country’s populace, the country cannot truly be relied upon. Furthermore, the support directly endangers their people. And it’s not just true for democracies, as the precarious position of Musharraf in Pakistan illustrates.
So it’s important to remember that this War on Terror is over the hearts and minds of the people, not just from the Middle East, but of the whole world.
March 18, 2004 08:53 PM in Foreign Affairs | PermalinkThanks for the interesting analysis. To expand on the point of mine that you quote, I think that the negative effect of this more apparent on people in the Middle East who might be interested in opposing Al Qaeda. I fear that they may believe that the West can’t be counted on to help them if they try to face Al Qaeda or Muslim fundamentalism down. (What I really fear is that they might be right).
Posted by Sebastian Holsclaw at 03/19/04, 12:25 AM (link)it’s a bit of a stretch to imagine that Spain’s pulling its troops out of Iraq has any bearing at all on its ability to fight the war on terror.
well, in the sense that your upper echelons of government have only a limited amount of time and focus, I think it’s a valid point.
Posted by praktike at 03/19/04, 12:33 PM (link)Sebastian: I think that the negative effect of this more apparent on people in the Middle East who might be interested in opposing Al Qaeda. I fear that they may believe that the West can’t be counted on to help them if they try to face Al Qaeda or Muslim fundamentalism down.
It’s not clear to me that this would be the effect. It also might be that the people of the Middle East realize that they are the ones who really have to deal with their extremists.
praktike: well, in the sense that your upper echelons of government have only a limited amount of time and focus, I think it’s a valid point.
Well, it’s my impression that the Spanish troops were being directed by the U.S., so there was little work involved by the Spanish government itself in any day-to-day decision making (and anyway, most of it would have been done by military folks, not government types).
Posted by fling93 at 03/20/04, 11:31 AM (link)